With the Las Vegas Grand Prix next weekend and the season into its final stretch, the numbers worth studying are not on the timing screens but on the balance sheets. Formula One team valuations have gone vertical: recent estimates put Ferrari around $6.5 billion, Mercedes not far behind, every one of the ten teams above $1.5 billion, and the grid average in the mid-three-billions — figures that would have been absurd when several of these teams were, in living memory, insolvent or nearly so. The cause is not glamour. It is two specific changes to how the sport is run.
The two rule changes
Under Liberty Media's ownership, the sport did two things that turned teams from money-pits into assets. First, it introduced a cost cap, putting a ceiling on what teams can spend on car development — which made the expense side predictable for the first time. Second, its Concorde Agreement flattened and floored the prize-money distribution, guaranteeing even the smaller teams a substantial, dependable income. Predictable costs plus dependable revenue equals a business you can underwrite. That is the whole story of the valuation boom in one sentence.
The sequence matters: the cost cap came first in importance. Capping spending did more than protect the smaller teams — it capped the losses of every team, which is the single change that turned a Formula One entry from an open-ended cash commitment into a bounded, modelable one. An asset whose worst-case annual loss is known is an asset a spreadsheet can value; an asset whose owner might have to write any-sized cheque to stay competitive is not.
From liability to annuity
The transformation is easiest to see in a single team. McLaren lost around $137 million on $166 million of revenue in 2018 — the profile of a team you would struggle to give away. By 2024 it was turning an operating profit on roughly $700 million of revenue. The same reversal, in different magnitudes, ran across the grid. A team stopped being a sponsorship-dependent cost center and became a cash-generative franchise — which is why Mercedes' team principal was able to sell a minority stake at a valuation around $6 billion, and why private capital is now a fixture in the paddock.
The re-rating fed on itself. As early institutional buyers validated the thesis, later buyers grew more confident, and the valuations they were willing to pay rose accordingly — the ordinary momentum of an asset class being discovered. What began as a handful of contrarian bets that F1 teams were undervalued has become a consensus that they are core holdings, and consensus is what turns a cheap asset into an expensive one. The interesting question is what happens to that consensus in the sport's first genuinely bad season.
The scarcity premium
On top of the improved economics sits pure scarcity. There are eleven teams, and Cadillac just paid roughly $450 million merely to become the eleventh — a transaction that effectively sets a floor under what a slot is worth. Institutional investors have moved in accordingly, taking stakes across the grid. When a fixed-supply asset starts generating reliable cash and appreciating steadily, the people who price such things for a living show up. They have.
The comp check
The bull case says F1 teams are still cheap. Ferrari at $6.5 billion is worth less than several mid-tier American sports franchises, and the sport has historically under-monetized its largest growth market, the United States — a gap now being closed by new US races and a new US broadcast arrangement. The bear case is the ordinary one for any asset that has run this far this fast: growth priced to perfection, a new set of technical regulations resetting the competitive order, and valuations that assume the last decade's trajectory simply continues. Both cases start from the same fact — that two rule changes turned a hobby into an asset class — and disagree only about how much room is left.
The identity of the buyers tells you what kind of asset this has become. Private-equity and institutional funds — the same category of investor buying stakes in football clubs and league rights — have taken positions across the grid, precisely because the cost cap bounds the downside and the guaranteed distributions floor the income. An asset with a capped loss and a contracted revenue base is one a fund can underwrite, which is the whole reason the paddock now looks like a portfolio-company roster.
The growth engine underneath the valuations is media. A new US broadcast arrangement reportedly worth around $140 million a year — a sharp step up from the prior deal — is the kind of re-rating that flows straight into every team's distribution and therefore every team's value. The bull case is that the sport is still under-monetized in its largest growth market and the media line has years of repricing ahead. The bear case is that this is exactly the assumption already baked into a Ferrari valuation north of $6 billion.
Also noted
Formula One's new US broadcast deal reportedly lands around $140 million a year, a sharp step up from the prior arrangement — a media-rights inflection that underpins much of the growth case.
The 2026 technical regulations reset the pecking order, which is both the sport's marketing hook and a real valuation risk: a team's on-track slump can dent its commercial trajectory.
The cost cap is the quiet hero of the story — by bounding the downside, it is what makes the teams underwritable for outside investors in the first place.
Next Sunday marks one year since Barcelona played its first competitive match back at Camp Nou. We'll look at what a partial reopening has actually done to the revenue line — with real numbers, not projections.
Views my own. Educational, not investment advice.
— @thesportsstrategist
